Conventional wisdom says that old habits die hard. When it comes to Washington’s relationship with Ankara, it seems that this timeless truism has once again been vindicated. Since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) ascended to power in the 2002 general election, U.S. foreign policy towards the Republic of Turkey has become an anachronism. As Erdoğan’s rule has precipitated some of the most dramatic democratic backsliding seen in the developed world, Turkey has shifted its allegiance away from the trans-Atlantic community and towards Russia and other revisionist powers. Nevertheless, the U.S. seems indefatigably committed to preserving its longstanding relationship with Turkey, irrespective of the costs.
There certainly are benefits to the U.S.-Turkey relationship from Washington’s perspective. These include maintaining joint counter-terrorism efforts, protecting U.S. maritime access to the Black Sea via the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, and preserving a trading relationship that supports 68,000 jobs at home and constitutes the U.S.’s fifth-largest export market. However, the strategic partnership with Ankara is becoming increasingly untenable.
While the U.S.-Turkey relationship may seem like it’s reached an all-time low, the partnership was always tenuous at best, mainly driven by mutual fears of communist advances. In the aftermath of the Turkish Straits crisis, Turkey joined NATO in 1951 to serve as a bulwark against Soviet aggression in the Near East. The fragility of the alliance was most evident during the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of Northern Cyprus. After the Cold War, the cracks in the relationship concealed by the two nations’ shared anti-communist stances were laid bare. During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. supported the establishment of the Iraqi Kurdistan autonomous region, which greatly incensed the Turkish government, who had been fighting Kurdish separatists within its borders for years, kicking off decades of Turkish suspicion of Washington. Nevertheless, the U.S. doggedly stuck by its supposed ally.
Relations between the United States and Turkey have deteriorated further as Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has grown more authoritarian. The June 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul kicked off the erosion of democratic institutions, and this trend has continued precipitously. In the August 2014 direct elections, Erdoğan became the first-ever directly elected president. In July 2016, an attempted coup was conducted by factions within the military, which many experts claim was orchestrated by Erdoğan himself to consolidate power. In April 2017 a constitutional referendum was held, which abolished the existing parliamentary system of government and established an executive presidency, enabling Erdoğan to stay in power until 2029. Democracy and human rights concerns have now emerged as one of the principal sources of tension in the American-Turkish intergovernmental relationship.
Additionally, American support for the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Operation Inherent Resolve, the military campaign against ISIS, has further damaged relations with Ankara. The YPG, which is embedded within the larger Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), maintains ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization that Turkey considers an existential threat. The SDF, along with the Peshmerga forces of Iraqi Kurdistan, has helped tremendously in the effort to roll back the physical ISIS caliphate. Yet, the Trump administration, at the behest of President Erdoğan, betrayed Kurdish allies by ordering all U.S. forces to withdraw from Kurdish-administered northern Syria in the fall of 2019, ahead of a Turkish incursion into the region to create a buffer zone between the Kurdish forces and the southern Turkish border. However, Trump’s decision was partially reversed by November 2019. Turkey’s latest decision to allow migrants from Syria traveling through Turkey to attempt to reach the European Union by crossing the Aegean Sea is just the latest example of how Ankara is willing to use refugees as pawns in a political game to punish the West.
Another contentious point in the U.S.-Turkey relationship is the fight over the extradition of Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, a moderate political and religious figure who is a common Erdoğan scapegoat, for the alleged crime of instigating the July 2016 coup attempt. Gülen currently resides in a compound in the Pocono Mountains of Pennsylvania, and President Trump has refused to hand him over to Ankara. President Erdoğan has tried to use bargaining chips, like the imprisoning of U.S. pastor Andrew Brunson. However, Trump wisely imposed sanctions on Turkey until Brunson’s release was secured.
Turkey’s purchase of the Russian made S-400 anti-aircraft system in 2017 for $2.5 billion has also roiled Washington because it represents Turkey’s biggest turn eastward to date. Experts also fear that the Russian system could pose a threat to U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets in Turkey’s arsenal because the system can pick up intelligence from the aircraft and send it back to Russian intelligence services. Since the purchase went through, the Trump administration has thus far refused to deploy two Patriot batteries on the Turkish southern border at the behest of Ankara, as a part of Turkey’s recent military offensive in Idlib Governorate in Syria, Operation Spring Shield.
Lastly, Erdoğan’s Turkey, along with its Qatari partners in Doha, has claimed the mantle of Sunni Islamism. The two nations’ support for Hamas in Gaza and the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, based out of Tripoli, have raised fears that instead of combating terrorism, they are more interested in fomenting extremism. Recently, Turkey flaunted its geopolitical clout by signing a disputed maritime border delineation agreement with the GNA. The deal is an attempt to redraw the exclusive economic zones of the Mediterranean and give Turkey a significant say in transnational gas exploration and pipeline construction in the sea basin, as the Energy Triangle natural gas extraction alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Israel gets underway.
The time has come for a new American posture towards Turkey. For too long, Erdoğan has undermined democracy at home and aided our adversaries abroad. Instead of maintaining our conciliatory approach to Turkey, as President Trump did by nearly withdrawing all troops from Syria, the administration should use its success in securing Pastor Brunson as a model for how to deal with the neo-Ottoman state. The U.S. should begin the process of removing its artillery from Incirlik Airbase to a more loyal ally like Jordan or even Israel, which could improve relations between the Jewish state and the wider region. Additionally, the U.S. should threaten to revoke Turkey’s NATO Article 5 collective defense protections if Erdoğan does not change his behavior. In the words of President Obama, “the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back.” Will we pick up the phone?
